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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, ) Utah Supreme Court 
) Case No. 20020307-SA 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, ) 
) Court of Appeals 
vs. ) Case No. 20000071-CA 
SEAN THOMPSON, ) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over both subject matter and procedural issues relevant 
to this case. Pursuant to Rule 46 (a)(4) of the Utah R. App. P., jurisdiction of this Court is 
properly invoked because of the following considerations: 
A. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter was filed on 
March 7, 2002. That opinion decided important questions of Utah state law, namely the 
scope and constitutionality of portions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-20 l-(l)(b). 
B. While it affirmed the validity and constitutionality of part of § 76-9-
201(l)(b), the Court of Appeals also held that other parts of the statute were facially 
overbroad and, therefore unconstitutional. As provided in Rule 46(a)(4) of the Utah R. 
App. P., the final interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (l)(b) has not yet been, but 
should be, settled by this Court. 
1 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) confers appellate jurisdiction upon this 
court to determine and/or review questions of whether a statute of this state complies with 
requirements of the United States and Utah constitutions. 
D. On April 8, 2002, Plaintiff-Petitioner (f,ProvoM) filed with this Court a 
petition for a writ of certiorari. On August 29, 2002, this Court granted that petition so 
that it could determine whether all or part of § 76-9-201 (l)(b) is constitutional. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly affirm the conviction of Defendant-
Respondent's ("Thompson") for telephone harassment under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 
(1) (b) since credible evidence supported the Trial Court's finding that he made repeated 
harassing telephone calls after having been told to stop? A trial court's findings of fact 
will generally not be reversed by an appellate court unless those findings are patently 
contrary to the weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous. Department of Human 
Services v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997); MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 
(Utah 1989) [citation omitted]. This issue was preserved in both at trial (R. 45-31) and 
before the Utah Court of Appeals (Appellee Brief, 1, 4-10). 
2. Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly conclude that part of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-9-201 (l)(b) is facially overbroad and thus unconstitutional? A challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute raises a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991,995 (Utah 1995); Strawberry Electric Service District v. 
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Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1996). When a constitutional issue is raised 
about a state statute, the presumption is that the statute is valid. Appellate courts try to 
resolve all questions in favor of constitutionality. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 
191, 193. Provo's attorney implicitly addressed the issue in his closing argument at trial 
(R. 45-31)1 and specifically argued the question before the Court of Appeals (Appellee 
Brief, 6-10) and in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari before this Court (Petition, 5-8). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 Telephone Harassment 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution 
in the jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with 
intent to annoy, alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or 
frighten any person at the called number or recklessly creating a risk thereof, 
the person: 
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues; 
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation 
ensues, or after having been told not to call back, causes the telephone 
of another to ring repeatedly or continuously; 
(c) makes a telephone call and insults, taunts or challenges 
the recipient of the telephone call or any person at the called number 
in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response; 
*In accordance with Rule 24(e) of the Utah R.App. P., in citations to the trial 
transcript, Provo will first identify the stamped page number found on the lower right 
comer of the transcript and which is the only number stamped on the transcript. That 
number is 45. Thereafter, a page number within the transcript is supplied to show a page 
number in the transcript. Thus, a citation of R. 45-12, gives the transcript stamp number 
followed by the page in the transcript on which the cited information may be found. 
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(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or profane language 
or suggests any lewd or lascivious act; or 
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical 
harm, or damage to any person or the property of any person. 
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-9-201 (amended in 2001) 
The provisions of the present § 76-9-201 (which were not in force during the time 
of Thompson's conviction) are set out in Addenda A and B to Provo's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 29, 1999, Thompson was charged by information with telephone 
harassment for violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999). At a bench trial before the 
Hon. Anthony W. Schofield of the Fourth District Court, Thompson was found guilty of 
telephone harassment. Thereupon, Thompson appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
That court affirmed his conviction, relying on language in the second part of subsection 
(l)(b) of the 1999 telephone harassment statute. Provo City v. Thompson, 2002 UT App 
63, TJ26, 44 P.3d 828, 834. But the Court of Appeals also held that the first part of 
subsection (l)(b) was facially overbroad and unconstitutional. Thompson, 2002 UT App 
63, ffi[21, 27, 44 P.3d at 833, 834-35. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Thompson and Carolyn Thayer ("Carolyn") had been married (R.45-5, 17), 
but their marriage ended in divorce some time before May 1, 1999. (R. 45-6). They had 
one child, a daughter Madison. (R. 4S-2U). 
2. During the late evening of May 1, and the very early hours of May 2, 1999, 
Thompson repeatedly called Carolyn on the telephone.2 The calls included a number of 
cmde questions, sexually-charged suggestions, attempts at intimidation ami tinea** lo take 
Madison away from Carolyn. (R. 45-6, 8). At the time Carolyn lived alone with Madison. 
(R. 45-5). During several of the phone conversations, Carolyn told Thompson to stop 
calling because he was scaring her, but he persisted in phoning her. (R. 45-8). Thompson 
did not rebut Carolyn's testimony that she asked him to stop calling, nor did he deny that 
he repeatedly ignored her requests that he stop. (R. 45-32). 
3. Shortly after midnight, Carolyn called the police complaining of telephone 
harassment. (R.45-9, 12). During the early morning of May 2, Officer Bastian arrived at 
the place where Carolyn was living. (R. 45-12). 
2Carolyn testified that Thompson called her about eighteen times within an hour 
during the evening-early morning of May 1-2, 1999. (R. 45-7). Officer Michael Bastian 
of the Provo Police Department ("Officer Bastian"), testified that the caller identification 
device on Carolyn's phone revealed eleven calls from Thompson to Carolyn during the 
relevant time period. (R. 45-13). Thompson, himself conceded that he may have called 
Carolyn some six or seven times during the late evening of May 1 and early morning of 
May 2, 1999. (R. 45-24). 
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4. Carolyn testified Thompson's frequent calls frightened her (R. 45-6). When 
Officer Bastian arrived, he found Carolyn in a 'Very upset"condition, "very nervous, 
emotional [and she] appeared kind of scared.1' (R. 45-12-13). 
5. Shortly after Officer Bastian came to Carolyn's residence, the phone rang 
again. The caller identification signal on Carolyn's phone disclosed another call from 
Thompson. (R. 45-13). When Officer Bastian picked up the phone, a man responded in a 
"slurred voice" that he was Thompson. When Officer Bastian asked why he had been 
calling so frequently that night, Thompson said he wanted to know if his wife loved him 
and that he wished to see Madison. (R. 45-13-14). Officer Bastian testified that in this 
conversation, Thompson made no mention at all about any concern he had for Carolyn's 
health or mental condition. Nor did he mention any fear about Madison's welfare. 
Thompson only said he wanted to see the daughter. (R. 45-29-30). 
6. During the telephone conversation, Officer Bastian told Thompson to stay 
where he was and await further contact. Soon afterward, Officer Bastian went to 
Thompson's apartment where the two met face to face. At that time, the officer smelled a 
strong odor of beer on Thompson. When the officer asked how much alcohol he had 
consumed that evening. Thompson told him he had drunk three beers in the last hour and 
more beer earlier. (R. 45-14). Thompson told the officer he was also taking anti-
depressant medication, whereupon the officer advised him not to mix prescription drugs 
with alcohol. (R.45-15). Carolyn testified when Thompson took anti-depressant 
medication and drank alcohol at the same time, "he goes weird sometimes." (R.45-7). 
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7. At the apartment, Thompson told the officer the reason he called Carolyn so 
many times was because he wanted to see his daughter.(R. 45-1 > j 1 hompson admits that 
in the conversation at his residence he forgot to tell Officer Bastian that he was concerned 
about his ex-wife's mental condition or her alleged threat to harm herself. (R. 45-22-23). 
He further concedes he never independently called the police to share his concerns about 
Carolyn's mental state or his fears that she might do herself harm. (R. 45-24). 
8. Shortly before 1:00 a.m. on the earl) mommy of May 2, 1999, Officer 
Bastian cited ! hompson for violating the Utah telephone harassment statute, Utah Code 
Ann. 76-9-201. (R. 1). 
9. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected Thompson's claim that 
he made repeated calls because of his fear that Carolyn would li.n in herself < »r Madison. 
(R. 45-32; Thompson supra, 2002 Ul App 63, ^ 7, 44 P.3d at 830 (including footnote 1). 
Carolyn denied telling Thompson she was having suicidal thoughts, or that she intended 
to harm herself or Madison. (R. 45-27). Officer Bastian testified that Thompson never 
told him of any concern he had about his wife's mental state or health during the early 
morning telephone conversation. I li 45-29-30). 1 lt< nnpson admitted he said nothing to 
Officer Bastian at the apartment about any suicidal intention of Carolyn or of any threat 
she made to harm herself or Madison. (R. 45-22-23). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMEN I S 
The Utah Court of Appeals properly affirmed 1 hompson's bench trial conviction 
for violating pai f ofl Mali ('ode Ann. § 76-9-201(b). The state has legitimate interests in 
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protecting the public from telephone calls made with the intent to harass, intimidate or 
annoy, particularly when repeated calls are made after the caller has been told to stop 
calling. Abundant evidence supports the trial court determination of Thompson's guilt 
and the Court of Appeals' affirmation of his conviction. Thompson has not appealed the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in declaring other parts of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-201(b) to be facially overbroad, and thus, unconstitutional. The statute 
in question regulates intentional misconduct, not the free expression of protected speech. 
Repeated instances of verbal harassment by telephone are not free speech. Imaginable, 
though remote, hypothetical situations should not invalidate a statute whose terms are 
limited to proscribing behavior intended to harass innocent people. The state may 
properly proscribe telephone messages which are repeatedly conveyed with an intent to 
intimidate, alarm or threaten another, regardless of whether conversation actually ensues. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THOMPSON WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF VIOLATING 
§ 76-9-201(b) OF UTAH'S TELEPHONE HARASSMENT STATUTE. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED BOTH HIS 
CONVICTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PART OF §76-9-201(b). 
The Court of Appeals opinion recognizes that the state has a legitimate interest in 
protecting the public from threatening, menacing telephone conversations. Thompson, 
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supra 2002 UT App 63, \ 17, 44 P.3d at 832. See also Thome v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241 
(4th Cir. 1988) (ff . . . The government has a strong and legitimate interest in preventing 
the harassment of individuals. . . . Because the telephone i, noimalh usnl for 
communication doe.* in I pit hide its use ir * harassing course of conduct" Thome, supra 
846 F.2d at 243). In Thompson, the Court of Appeals affirmed Thompson's conviction 
and the constitutionality of part of § 76-9-201(b) because three factors coalesced. First, 
Thompson intended to annoy Carolyn; second, Carolyn told him not to call anymore; and 
third, Thompson t unturned to call despite her requests tliat lie stop. Thompson, 2002 UT 
App 63, Tj 24, 44 P.3d at 834. Each of these elements is amply evidenced in the record. 
(R. 45-6, 7, 8, 13, 15) and together they form the basis for the trial court's finding of 
Thompson's guilt (R. 45-32, 33). In order for an appellate court to overturn the trial 
court's findings of fact those findings must be sin HI ti > k t1 early enoneous. State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 4/4, 475^75 ^utah 1990). Here, the bench trial judge's findings are 
abundantly supported by credible evidence which easily sustains his decision. The Court 
of Appeals properly affirmed those findings and upheld conviction. Thompson did not 
appeal the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals within the time required by Utah R. 
App. P. Rule 4(a) (1990). 
The Court of Appeals also held that part of § 76-9-201(b) was constitutional and 
survived First Amendment challenges grounded in alleged facial overbreadth and 
vagueness. Thompson, supra, % 27, 44 P.3d at 834-35. While a constitutional t halh nge 
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to a statute raises a legal issue to be reviewed by this Court on a correctness standard, the 
presumption is that the statute is valid. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor 
of constitutionality. State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1999) (dictum); Mohi, 
supra, 901 P.2d at 995 (Utah 1999). Courts in sister states have upheld the validity of 
telephone harassment statutes similar to Utah's. State v. Richards, 896 P.2d 357, 361-63 
(Ida.App. 1995). See also, State v. Musser, 977 P.2d 131, 132-33 (Ariz. 1999). While 
Provo disagrees with that part of the Court of Appeals decision in Thompson which held 
some of § 76-9-201(b) unconstitutional, the other portions of the opinion which upheld 
Thompson's conviction and the validity of the rest of § 76-9-201(b) should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY INVOKED THE "FACIAL 
OVERBREADTH" DOCTRINE TO STRIKE DOWN PART OF §76-9-201(b). 
THE UTAH STATUTE AIMS AT REGULATING IMPROPER CONDUCT, 
NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH. THEORETICAL, 
UNREALISTIC AND HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS DO NOT INVALIDATE 
A STATUTE WHICH SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES CRIMINAL INTENT IN 
ORDER FOR CONDUCT TO BE ACTIONABLE. 
a) The concept of facial overbreadth should be sparingly applied and 
then only to statutes which substantially intrude upon protected activity. 
Governments and courts must be sensitive to laws which impermissibly curtail 
speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. A statute 
which is overbroad on its face may be declared invalid if it violates the First Amendment. 
But a leading United States Supreme Court decision has held that the doctrine of facial 
overbreadth is to be sparingly applied, "only as a last resort," and should not be invoked 
10 
when a limiting construction can properly be applied. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 613 (1973). See also, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982). A statute will 
not be held overbroad unless it makes unlawful a substantial ai noi int of constitutionally 
protected condiict. Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah App. 1997). In 
Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1991), a federal court held that a claim of 
facial overbreadth involving a state telephone harassment law would be upheld only if: 
. . . there is a significant imbalance between the protected 
speech the statute should not punish and the unprotected speech it 
legitimately reaches: ' Overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, 
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly 
legitimate sweep.' [citation omitted] The defendant must demonstrate 
'a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise 
recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the 
court' before a statute will be struck down as facially overbroad 
[citation omitted]. The fact that a court can hypothesize some 
deterrent effect on protected speech is insufficient for overbreadth 
purposes. . . Shackelford, supra, 948 F.2d at 940 (emphasis supplied). 
Where a statute, such as Utah Code Ann.76-9-201, is directed against offensive 
conduct and not to any legitimate communication of ideas, courts have been unwilling to 
extend the facial overbreadth doctrine unless there is a showing of a likely and substantial 
incursion into protected speech. Lopez, supra, 935 P.2d at 1263 In Broadrick, supra, the 
United States Supreme Court emphasized that the more a statute's clear purpose is to 
regulate conduct which disturbs public peace, and the statute's subject matter shifts away 
from protected speech and focuses instead on offensive criminal behavior within the 
legitimate scope of the state's interests, the less likely It is that a coi n t "\ v ill uphold an 
overbreaei 1111" 11 all enge: 
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. . . [F]acial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our 
traditional rules of practice and . . . its function, a limited one at 
the outset, attenuates as . . .unprotected behavior . . . moves from 'pure 
speech' toward conduct [which]-even if expressive-falls within the 
scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state 
interests. . . over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. 
Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech 
to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best 
a prediction-cannot with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its 
face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct 
that is admittedly within its power to proscribe [citation omitted]. 
Broadrick, supra 406 U.S. at 615. And see. Members of the City Council 
of Los Angeles v. Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799-800 (1984). 
In upholding Idaho's telephone harassment statute against a claim of constitutional 
overbreadth, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted: "The strength of an overbreadth challenge 
diminishes where the statutory proscription is directed at behavior other than pure 
speech." Richards, supra, 896 P.2d at 362 [citation omitted]. In Gormley v. Director, 
Connecticut Department of Probation, 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.1980), a United States Court 
of Appeals upheld a Connecticut telephone harassment statute (quite similar to Utah's): 
Harassing telephone calls are an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy. They appear to be on the increase. They are properly outlawed 
by federal and state statutes. The possible chilling effect on free 
speech of the Connecticut statute strikes us as minor compared 
with the all-too-prevalent and widespread misuse of the telephone 
to hurt others. The risk that the statute will chill people from, or 
prosecute them for, the exercise of free speech is remote. The evil 
against which the statute is directed is both real and ugly. Gormley, 
supra, 632 F.2d at 942 (emphasis added). 
And see, City Council of Los Angeles, supra, where the United States Supreme Court 
observed that an " . . . incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms . . . 
12 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of. . . [a legitimate] interest" is justified if 
the state legislation is within the constitutional power of the state, fosters an important 
governmental interest, and is unrelated to the suppression o) pi ofeeted expression. City 
Council of Los Angeles, supra, 466 U.S. at 805. 
Applying these principles to Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 it is apparent that the 
Utah telephone harassment statute is directed at offensive conduct, i.e. misuse of the 
telephone, made with a criminal intent to "annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, 
threaten, harass or frighten" another. The statute does not attempt to regulate telephone 
conversations which are made for legitimate communicative purposes or the content of 
any such calls. Any intrusion of the statute into areas of protected speech is not only 
insubstantial, but remote. The plain language of § 76-9-201 only addresses telephone 
calls in which the speaker has a specific, criminal intent to disturb another's legitimate 
rights to peace and privacy. The statute's plain language is limited to criminal misuse of 
the telephone where one intends to inflict abuse or suffering on the person called. 
b) Where a statute is primarily directed at regulating criminal 
misconduct, and only peripherally affects protected speech, facial overbreadth is of 
limited applicability, particularly where the statute requires criminal intent. 
\ number of cases have recognized that where a statute requires specific criminal 
intent to do a prohibited act, such requirement decreases the possibility that such statute is 
void for vagueness. In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the United States 
Supreme Court wrote: 
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. . . The Court, indeed has recognized that the requirement of a 
specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences 
to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite 
statute invalid. . . . [W]here punishment imposed is only for an 
act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute 
prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning 
or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation of law. Screws, 
supra, 325 U.S. at 101-102. See also United States v. Lampley, 
573 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir. 1978) (telephone harassment case). 
A number of decisions have applied the specific intent standard not just to the 
issue of vagueness, but to the overbreadth question as well. In Lopez, the Utah Court of 
Appeals noted: 
. . . '[Particularly where conduct and not merely speech is 
involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only 
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's 
plainly legitimate sweep.' [citing Broadrick, supra 413 U.S. at 615]. 
Lopez, supra, 935 P.2d at 1263. 
And see footnote 8 in the decision Connecticut v. Roesch, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1751, 1, where a state superior court noted in a telephone harassment case: 
. . . The specific intent requirement of the harassment statute is 
also an important factor militating toward a finding ofUnsubstantial 
overbreadth, [citation omitted]. That same specific intent element 
can save an otherwise overbroad statute because such a requirement 
narrows the statute's applicability by excluding from its ambit 
those whose expression may have innocently or unknowingly caused 
a disturbance. Roesch, supra, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1751 at 17-18. 
(emphasis supplied). 
In Ferber, the United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction of one charged 
with violating New York's obscenity statute. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the 
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Supreme Court indicated: "We consider this the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose 
legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications." Ferber, supra 458 U.S. 
at 773. The Supreme Court also reemphasized its prior rulings thai " where conduct 
and not merely speech is involved,. . .the overbreadth of a statute must not only be 
real, but substantial as well . . . " Ferber, supra, 458 U.S. at 770. In a footnote to its 
opinion, the Court explained: 
. . . "This Court has . . . . repeatedly expressed its reluctance 
to strike down a statute on its face where there were a substantial 
number of situations to which it might be validly applied. Thus, 
even if there are marginal applications in which a statute would 
infringe on First Amendment values, facial invalidation is 
inappropriate if the 'remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole 
range of easily identifiable and constitutionally prescribable . . . 
conduct. . . [citations omitted].'" Ferber, supra 458 U.S. at 770 
(footnote 25). 
The Utah statute punishes only telephone calls made with criminal intent to annoy, 
alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse1, UIKMUMI harass or frighten another. While subsections 
(a) through (e) of old § 76-9-201 outline specific kinds of prohibited calls,3 the threshold 
finding for conviction under all those subsections is whether the caller intentionally, and 
with criminal design, attempted to disturb another's legally protected rights to peace and 
3In Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App. 86, ffl| 11, 13, 16, 1 P3d 1113, 1115-16 
(Utah App. 2000), the Court of Appeals struck down sections (a) and (d) of § 76-9-201 
and appears to have voided language in the statute about "recklessly creating a risk 
{Whatcott, supra at f^ 11, 1 P.3d at. 1115. The Whatcott holding as to old sections (a) and 
(d) are not involved in Provo's petition for its writ of certiorari before this Court. 
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privacy. The Utah statute does not attempt to regulate the sharing or dissemination of any 
constitutionally protected speech. Rather, it seeks to limit the actions of those who use 
telephones with a specific intent to cause grief and mental havoc. Facial overbreadth 
should not shield those who try to plague others by misusing modern technology. 
c) Conceivable, but remote or theoretical or unrealistic, constraints on 
protected speech should not invalidate a statute which, by its terms, restricts only 
intentional, criminal misconduct, not free communication of ideas* 
Shackelford, supra involved a telephone harassment matter in which the Fifth 
Federal Circuit Court affirmed defendant's conviction. One of the issues on appeal was 
whether a state statute which prohibited making telephone calls " . . . with intent to 
terrify, intimidate or harass and threaten . . . " was facially overbroad. Shackelford, 
supra 948 F.2d at 937. The Court of Appeals observed the general principle that: ". . . 
[T]he fact that a court can hypothesize some deterrent effect on protected speech is 
insufficient for overbreadth purposes.ff Shackelford, supra 948 F.2d at 940. See also, 
Lopez, supra 935 P.2d at 1263-64. Similarly, in City Council of Los Angeles, supra, the 
United States Supreme Court wrote:1' . . . [T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some 
impermissible application of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an 
overbreadth challenge." City Council of Los Angeles, supra 466 U.S. at 800. In a 
footnote to that opinion, the Court cited with approval portions of a law review article: 
. . . The bare possibility of unconstitutional application is not 
enough; the law is unconstitutionally overbroad only if it reaches 
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substantially beyond the permissible scope of legislative regulation. 
City Council of Los Angeles, supra, 466 U.S. at 800 (footnote 19). 
(Citing Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L. J. 409, 425 
(1983)). 
Two sister state opinions reach similar conclusions. In State v. Musser, supra, an 
en banc decision of the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted the constitutionality of a state 
telephone harassment statute which provided in part that it was unlawful " . . . for any 
person with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, to use a 
telephone . . .[to] threaten to inflict injury or physical harm . . . " The defendant argued 
that the statute could chill free speech of one who wished to file a civil suit, fire an 
employee, or boycott a restaurant which engaged in racial discrimination." Musser, supra 
977 P.2d at 131-132. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed: 
. . . While Musser [the defendant] has conceived of some 
impermissible applications of the statute, he has provided no 
indication that any likelihood exists that the state would use the 
statute to reach such activities. Indeed, interpreting the statutory 
language to permit prosecution for such activities would require 
the state and the courts to expand the statute's reach considerably 
beyond that which the legislature intended, [citation omitted]. 
Musser, supra 977 P.2d at 132-33. 
And in Richards, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction 
of one convicted for violating Idaho's telephone harassment statute. That statute forbade 
one from making improper use of the telephone " . . . with the intent to annoy, terrify, 
threaten, intimidate, harass or offend . . ." Richards, supra, 896 P.2d at 357, another 
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person. One of the issues on appeal was whether the Idaho statute violated the First 
Amendment because of the law's alleged overbreadth. The court rejected the defendant's 
argument, holding: 
. . . The statute prohibits only telephone calls made with the 
intent to harass. Phone calls made with the intent to communicate 
are not prohibited. Harassment, in this case, thus is not protected 
merely because it is accomplished using a telephone, [citations 
omitted]. 
By requiring that the sole intent of the call be to annoy, 
terrify, threaten, intimidate, harass or offend, the statute places 
outside of its ambit calls which, though they may insult or 
offend the recipient, carry a legitimate purpose such as conveying 
a complaint about a business practice or government policy or 
attempting to persuade the hearer to a particular social, religious 
or political point of view. Consequently, we see little risk that the 
statute will have a chilling effect on the bona fide exercise of 
free speech. Richards, supra 896 P.2d at 362. 
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals wrote that Utah Code Ann. §76-9-
201(l)(a) can be read to " . . . prohibit a potentially huge universe of otherwise legitimate 
telephone calls." Thompson, supra 2002 UT App. 63 at \ 17, 44 P.3d at 832.4 The Court 
then posited five examples showing the alleged overbreadth of old subsection (l)(a), even 
though in its earlier Whatcott decision the Court had already stricken that subsection and 
even though Thompson involved a conviction under (l)(b) of the old statute. Thompson, 
supra, 2002 UT App. 63, at If 18, 44 P.3d at 832-33 (again citing Whatcott, supra, 2000 
UT App. at K 14, 1 P.3d at 1115). The five examples include: 1) unwanted telephone 
4Citing Whatcott, supra, 2000 UT App. 86, at fflf 10-11, 1 P.3d at 1115. 
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solicitations, presumably made by a telemarketer, during a dinner hour; 2) calls by a 
frantic mother to confirm the well-being of a young adult who recently moved out of the 
family home; 3) a consumer's complaint about product's lack of performance made to a 
seller or producer of the product; 4) calls from a businessman to another to protest the 
latter's failure to honor a contract; and 5) a constituent's call to a legislator in protest of 
the lawmaker's stand on a political issue. In each of these five instances, the Court of 
Appeals assumed there was a ". . substantial likelihood that the call would annoy . ." the 
recipient. Thompson, supra 2002 UT App. 63 at ^ 18, 44 P.3d at 832-33 (emphasis 
supplied). However (and apart from the argument that the each of the five examples by 
the Court's own language pertains to a subsection no longer in force), a careful review of 
each the five Court of Appeals hypothetical situations reflects speech which could not be 
actionable under the old or present telephone harassment statute. 
Provo respectfully submits that the first flaw in the Court of Appeals reasoning is 
that its five examples focus only on the "annoyance" of the call recipient of the telephone 
call. But the statute does not address the mental state of the person who receives the call. 
It is the criminal intent of the caller that is determinative.. Liability under § 76-9-201 
arises only when the person who makes the call does so " . . with intent to annoy, alarm, 
. . intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass or frighten" the person called. § 76-9-201(1). 
The distinction between criminal intent of the caller and the subjective state of 
mind of the recipient of the call was central to the Michigan Court of Appeals decision in 
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People v. Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. App. 1984), a case involving Michigan's 
public communication harassment statute. That law rendered unlawful the use of a 
communications system " . . . with intent to terrorize, frighten, intimidate, threaten, 
harass, molest or annoy . . ."another person. Taravella, supra 350 N.W.2d at 782. In 
affirming the lower court conviction of the defendant the Michigan court held: 
Do telephone calls by an angry parent to a student with 
failing grades, by a dissatisfied consumer or by a disgruntled 
constituent, if accompanied by language thought to be "offensive" 
by the recipient of the call, subject the caller to criminal sanctions 
under the statute? In each case, defendant claims, the caller's 
exercise of his constitutional right of free speech might "annoy," 
"frighten" or be considered "obscene" or "harassing" by the listener. 
Thus, under defendant's interpretation of the statute, it is the 
listener's perception or characterization of the nature of the call 
which would control. We disagree. The statute clearly provides 
that the focus is on the caller; it is the malicious intent with which 
the transmission is made that establishes the criminality of the 
conduct, [citation omitted]. Thus, irrespective of the listener's 
subjective perceptions, without the necessary intent on the part of 
the caller the use of obscene words alone would not fall within 
the statutory proscriptions. Taravella, supra, 350 N.W.2d at 784. 
The second flaw in the Utah Court of Appeals reasoning in Thompson is that all 
five of its examples ignore the caller's state of mind. One whose dinner cools may resent 
a telemarketer's solicitation, a young person might strafe at a mother's attempts to intrude 
into his newly-claimed freedom, a producer can feel pressure because a buyer expresses 
dissatisfaction with a product, a businessman could take umbrage when a colleague 
claims he has breached a contract, and a politician bristle when his political position is not 
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appreciated by a constituent. But none of the emotions felt by any of the call recipients 
are material elements in a telephone harassment criminal claim. Instead, the crucial fact 
is the intent of the caller. In none of the five examples is there any conduct or speech of 
the caller which could possibly result in criminal liability. The telemarketer's intent is to 
make a sale, the mother wishes to be assured of her child's well-being, the buyer is 
worried about a malfunctioning product, a businessman about the viability of a contract 
and a voter about issues he believes have political importance. Each of the five situations 
involves a legitimate interest of a caller which is far beyond the pale of any conceivable 
prosecution. In none of the examples is there the remotest suggestion that any caller had 
the criminal intent necessary for a conviction under § 76-9-201. 
d) Harassment made with criminal intent is not protected free speech. 
In Lampley, supra the majority opinion of the Third Circuit upheld the validity of a 
United States telephone harassment statute which forbade calls made " . . . with intent to 
annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at the called number." 573 F.2d at 785. In its 
opinion upholding the defendant's lower court conviction, the Federal court noted: 
. . . The appellant has not claimed, nor could he successfully do 
so, that it is beyond the power of the Congress to impose criminal 
sanctions on the placement of interstate telephone calls to harass, 
abuse or annoy. Not all speech enjoys the protection of the first 
amendment, [citations omitted]... . Congress had a compelling 
interest in the protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse 
or annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the telephone, 
not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives, [citations 
omitted]. Lampley, supra 573 F.2d at 787. 
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Similarly, a Fourth Federal Circuit Court decision, Thome v. Bailey, supra, is a 
case in which the circuit court affirmed lower court decisions which convicted defendant 
of violating the West Virginia telephone harassment statute. Citing language from the 
state Supreme Court's plurality opinion, the circuit court indicated: 
Prohibiting harassment is not prohibiting speech, because 
harassment is not a protected speech. Harassment is not communication, 
although it may take the form of speech. The statute prohibits only 
telephone calls made with the intent to harass. Phone calls made with 
the intent to communicate are not prohibited. Harassment, in this 
case, thus is not protected merely because it is accomplished using 
a telephone.[citation omitted]. Thome, supra 846 F.2d at 243. 
See also, Richards, supra 896 P.2d at 362 (citing the same language from the West 
Virginia State Supreme Court in Thome, supra 333 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1985). 
And finally, in De Willis v. Texas, 951 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App. 1997), a case 
involving the Texas telephone harassment statute, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a 
trial court verdict against a defendant who claimed the statute was unconstitutionally 
vague. The state statute in part was addressed to one who made telephone calls and 
thereby M. . . intentionally, knowingly or recklessly annoys or alarms the recipient." 
DeWillis, supra 951 S.W.2d at 215. Disposing of the defendant's attack on the statute, 
the Texas Court noted: 
. . . [W]e find no authority supporting the proposition that 
causing another person's telephone to ring repeatedly or repeatedly 
making anonymous telephone calls is a constitutionally protected 
activity under the First Amendment. . . . DeWillis, supra, 951 
S.W.2dat217. 
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The cited case law strongly suggests that misuse of the telephone made with intent 
to harass is not speech which is entitled to First Amendment protection. The language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201(1) (b) specifically requires a finding of criminal intent before 
a person may be convicted pursuant to its provisions. The statute thus properly restricts 
unprotected conduct, but does not impinge on protected speech and should be upheld. 
e) The prohibition of repeated phone calls made with criminal intent to 
annoy, harass, intimidate, threaten, frighten or abuse is a legitimate subject of state 
power. One who violates a statute which prohibits these practices may properly be 
punished for his intentional conduct, whether or not a conversation actually ensues. 
The version of § 76-9-201 (l)(b) in effect at the time of Thompson's conviction 
and the amendment subsequent to his conviction each provide that if one uses a telephone 
with intent to annoy, harass, etc. another, the person making the call may violate the 
statute if he or she: 1) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation 
ensues; 2) makes repeated calls after having been told not to call back; or 3) causes the 
telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously. The facts in this case involve the 
second category, i.e. making repeated calls after having been told not to call back. As 
argued in Point I of this brief, the finding of the Court of Appeals affirming Thompson's 
conviction should be upheld. But the Court of Appeals also invoked the doctrine of facial 
overbreadth to strike down the first part of § 76-9-201 (l)(b), namely making repeated 
calls where no actual conversation takes place. The lower court opined " . . . prohibiting 
repeated calls rather than only single calls does little to narrow the field of otherwise 
legitimate communications . . ." Thompson, supra, 2002 UT App 63, f 20, 44 P.3d at 
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833. Implicit in the Court of Appeals holding is the concept that one may freely and 
repeatedly annoy, harass, threaten, etc., until one is told to stop. Thompson, supra, 2002 
UT App 63, f^ 24, 44 P.3d at 834. At a minimum the court appears to give every caller at 
least one free harassment call, and more unless the recipient instructs the caller not to call 
again. An actual conversation first must occur between the telephone caller and the 
recipient before there can be telephone harassment even if repeated messages are left. 
But in an age of answering service and message forwarding, harassment can and 
does occur even if a hearer is not actually on the line at the time the call is made. One can 
repeatedly leave false messages from a public telephone that harm has befallen a call 
recipient's family member or friend; one can phone repeatedly at all hours of the night 
and hang up before the caller responds; one can leave false, anonymous threats that a 
person will be sued or arrested or convey embarrassing untruths about someone's spouse 
or family member. But according to the Court of Appeals ruling, as there has been no 
request to stop calling, there is no violation of the statute even if the caller is unable to tell 
who made the call or where it originated. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have upheld the validity of telephone harassment 
statutes which prohibit harassment even if no conversation ensues. In New York v. Shack, 
658 N.E.2d 706 (N.Y. 1995), the highest New York court upheld the conviction of a 
defendant who violated the state's telephone harassment statute. That statute prohibited 
making a call " . . . with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm [when] he . . [mjakes a 
telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate 
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communication." Shack, supra, 658 N.E.2d at 709. The defendant left many messages 
on his former psychologist's answering machine, threatened to make calls to her family 
and extended family members. He left word that if she would not return his calls, he 
would sell her telephone number to a "pervert" who would delight in making her life 
miserable. He also threatened to call a state licensing board and have her license to 
practice revoked. Shack, supra 658 N.E.2d at 709-710. In upholding the conviction the 
New York Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's contention that the state telephone 
harassment statute was constitutionally overbroad. Shack, supra 658 N.E.2d at 711-12. 
In Gormley, supra, the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a 
Connecticut statute which prohibited use of the telephone " . . . with intent to harass, 
annoy or alarm another person . . . whether or not a conversation ensues . . ." Gormley, 
supra 632 F.2d at 940. In upholding the state statute against defendant's claim that it was 
facially overbroad, the court wrote: 
The asserted overbreadth of the Connecticut statute is 
circumscribed by the elements of the offense it proscribes. To 
run afoul of the statute, a telephone call must be made not merely 
to communicate, but "with intent to harass, annoy or alarm" . . . 
Whether speech actually occurs is irrelevant, since the statute 
proscribes conduct, whether or not a conversation actually ensues. 
Gormley, supra 632 at 942. See also, Pennsylvania v. Hendrickson, 
684 A.2d 171, 175-76 (Pa. Super. 1996). 
And in Lampley, supra the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a United States 
statute which made it unlawful " . . . to make a telephone call, whether or not conversation 
ensues . . . with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass . . . " Lampley, supra, 573 F.2d 
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at 785. One of the defenses raised by the defendant was that in some of the conversations 
he had not directly spoken to the person he was calling. The Circuit Court rejected this 
argument, holding in part: 
. . . Nor is it necessary, as appellant suggests, that the call recipient 
verbally respond to the operator's words. Communication sufficient 
to constitute "conversation" occurs when the operator speaks to the 
listening recipient. Lampley, supra 573 F.2d at 788. 
The preceding authorities all suggest that a conviction based on a telephone 
caller's improper criminal intent may properly be affirmed regardless of whether a 
conversation has actually taken place and that a statute so providing is not constitutionally 
defective. 
f) Telephone harassment statutes similar to Utah's have often been 
upheld by courts in other jurisdictions. 
Throughout this brief Provo has made mention of telephone harassment laws in 
other jurisdictions which have been sustained against claims of facial overbreadth. E.g. 
Taravella, supra, 350 N.W.2d at 785 (and cases cited). In many respects the Idaho state 
statute relevant to Richards, supra is similar to Utah's statute § 76-9-201. See Idaho 
Code §18-6710, cited in Richards, supra 896 P.2d at 361. Like Utah's statute, the Idaho 
telephone harassment law includes language about both an "intent to annoy, terrify, 
threaten, intimidate, harass or offend" and " . . . repeated anonymous or identified 
telephone calls whether or not conversation ensues . . . " The Idaho statute was upheld by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in 1995. Also in 1995 New York's highest court upheld the 
telephone harassment conviction in Shack, a case where many of the threatening calls 
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were made on an answering machine and there was no one physically present on the other 
line of the call. Shack, supra 658 N.E. at 709-10, 714. In Thome, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed a defendant's conviction and the validity of a West Virginia 
telephone harassment statute which proscribed use of a telephone " . . . with intent to 
harass or abuse another . . . whether or not conversation ensues." W.Va. Code § 61-8-
16(a), cited in Thome, supra 846 F.2d at 242, 243, 245. See also, Gormley, supra 632 
F.2d at 943; Hendrickson, supra 684 A.2d at 175-76, 179. Provo recognizes there are 
earlier decisions which struck down telephone harassment statutes, e.g. People v. Klick, 
362 N.E.2d 329 (111. 1977), Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (en banc), but 
urges that the better reasoned and generally more recent cases frequently uphold statutes 
similar to Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
As argued in Part I of the Argument section of its brief here, Provo asks that this 
Court affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals decision which upheld Thompson's 
conviction and the validity of the second part of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201(l)(b). For 
all the reasons outlined in Argument II of this brief, Provo requests that the Court 
overrule that part of the lower appellate court's decision which declared the first part of 
§ 76-9-201 (l)(b) to be facially overbroad and thus unconstitutional. 
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Utah Code Ann. @ 76-9-201 
@ 76-9-201. Telephone harassment 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in 
the jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with 
intent to annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten 
another at the called number, the person: 
(a) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues, 
or after having been told not to call back, causes the telephone of another to 
ring repeatedly or continuously; 
(b) makes a telephone call and insults, taunts, or challenges the 
recipient of the telephone call or any person at the called number in a manner 
likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response; or 
(c) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical harm, 
or damage to any person or the property of any person. 
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
Addendum A 
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1 TELEPHONE HARASSMENT AMENDMENTS 
2 2001 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Sponsor: Terry R. Spencer 
5 This act modifies the Criminal Code by deleting language regarding the offense of telephone 
6 harassment that has been found unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court 
7 This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
8 AMENDS: 
9 76-9-201, as last amended by Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 1996 
10 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
11 Section 1. Section 76-9-201 is amended to read: 
12 76-9-201. Telephone harassment 
13 (1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in the 
14 jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to annoy, alarm 
15 [another], intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten [an> person] another at the called 
16 number [or recklessly creating a risk thereof], the person: 
17 [(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues;] 
18 [(b)] (a) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues, or after 
19 having been told not to call back, causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or 
20 continuously; 
21 [(e)] (b} makes a telephone call and insults, taunts, or challenges the recipient of the 
22 telephone call or any person at the called number in a manner likely to provoke a violent or 
23 disorderly response; 
24 § [[(d)j (g) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or pi ofane language or suggests any 
25 lewd or lascivious act;] § or 
26 [(c)] § [^] (cl § makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical harm, or damage 
27 to any person or the property of any person. 
- 1 - Senate Committee Amendments 1-31-2001 ni/* 
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28 (2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
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ORME, Judge: 
111 Defendant Sean G. Thompson appeals from a bench trial conviction of telephone harassment, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999), as adopted by Provo City. Defendant argues that 
section 76-9-201 is both unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. He also argues that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that portions of section 76-9-201 are indeed facially 
overbroad. However, we affirm defendant's conviction because we conclude that the portion of subsection 76-9-
201(1)(b) most applicable to defendant's actions is neither facially overbroad nor void for vagueness, and 
because we find no merit in defendant's ineffective assistance claim. 
BACKGROUND 
112 'Wien reviewing a bench trial, '[w]e recite the facts from the record most favorable to the findings of the trial 
court.'" State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 784 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 
476 (Utah 1990)). "We present conflicting evidence only when necessary to understand issues raised on appeal." 
State y Jtaiaer. 2000-UT-6QJI? fi P 3H 111R 
Addendum C 
fl3 In early May 1999 defendant's ex-wife, Carolyn, and their five-month-old daughter lived alone in an apartment 
in Provo City During the late evening of May 1, and the early morning of May 2, 1999. defendant phoned Carolyn 
ten times within the space of an hour Carolyn told defendant two or three timesthat his calls were fnghtening her 
and asked him to quit calling When defendant continued to call, Carolyn phoned the police 
||4 Officer Bastian arrived at Carolyn's apartment at 12 47 a m and observed that Carolyn was "nervous, 
emotional, [and] appeared kind of scared " She told Officer Bastian that defendant "had been calling her and 
jpsetting her by his frequent phone calls and [that] she just wanted him to stop" As Officer Bastian spoke with 
Carolyn, the phone in her apartment rang again The phone's caller identification function indicated that the call 
/vas from defendant bringing his total calls to eleven within the hour 
f]5 Officer Bastian answered the phone and asked who was calling Defendant identified himself Officer Bastian 
old defendant not to leave his apartment because he, Officer Bastian, would soon be amving Officer Bastian 
hen went to defendant's apartment and cited defendant for telephone harassment 
]6 Defendant claimed at trial that Carolyn initiated the first telephone call and expressed suicidal intentions 
Defendant said he had "learned in school and from counselors and therapists" that "whenever you're faced with a 
>ituation where you're talking with somebody who is threatening to commit suicide , as soon as they hang 
jp you immediately call them back to get them on the line and keep talking to them, and if they hang up, call 
)ack" Thus he claimed he did not call Carolyn repeatedly with any intent to annoy her, but only out of concern 
or her safety 
[7 Defendant failed however, to mention any of his concerns for Carolyn's safety to Officer Bastian either when 
Officer Bastian first spoke to defendant on the telephone^ or when Officer Bastian arnved at defendants 
ipartment Instead Officer Bastian testified that defendant admitted he had been drinking and that he had also 
aken antidepressant medication Defendant testified that when Officer Bastian scolded him for dnnking too much 
le became concerned because Officer Bastian threatened to arrest him and simply forgot to mention his 
Dr Carolyn 
8 Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of telephone harassment Specifically, the trial court found 
nat defendant made "a large number of telephone calls" to Carolyn, that "she asked the defendant not to make 
dditional calls and yet he continued to do so" and that defendant's "clear intent [was] to annoy " Defendant 
ow appeals 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
9 Defendant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel We generally will not review a claim of 
leffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal unless the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal 
nd the record is adequate to review the defendant's claims See State v Maestas 1999 UT 32,^20, 984 P 2d 
76 State v Vessev, 967 P 2d 960, 964-65 (Utah Ct App 1998) If these conditions are met, "we will review 
neffective assistance] claims as a matter of law" Maestas, 1999 UT 32 at fi20 "To establish that he received 
^effective assistance of counsel, [defendant] must show that his counsel 'rendered deficient performance which 
?ll below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment' and that 'counsel's deficient performance 
rejudiced him "' Id. (quoting State v Chacon, 962 P 2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998)) 
10 Defendant also argues that Utah Code Ann § 76-9-201 (1999) violates the First Amendment of the United 
tates Constitution^ because it is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face1^ and because it is void for vagueness 
\ constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law, which we review for correctness \Mien 
ddressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts 
\ favor of constitutionality " State v Lopes, 1999 UT 24,^6, 980 P 2d 191 (citation omitted) 
I Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
11 We only briefly address defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which are unavailing Defendant 
laims two deficiencies in his counsel's performance First, he alleges that had counsel properly investigated, 
ounsel would have found evidence that Carolyn had previously shown suicidal tendencies Such evidence, he 
claims, would have bolstered defendant's testiirony that he did not call repeatedly with intent to annoy but rather 
to prevent Carolyn from harming herself. However, there is nothing in the record identifying what evidence 
counsel may have found had he investigated further. Defendant states only in his brief that he "had evidence of a 
prior occasion in which [Carolyn] threatened to kill herself and all passengers . . . who were with her while she 
was driving a car." However, defendant did not request a remand under Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure to substantiate the assertion he now argues would support his claim of ineffective assistance. VWhout 
a proper record before us, we are unable to say whether counsel's alleged deficiency in failing to investigate 
prejudiced defendant. See State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 964-65 & n.5 (Utah CL App. 1998). 
1J12 Defendant also claims counsel's performance was deficient in not drawing more attention to two contradictory 
statements made by Carolyn. On direct examination, Carolyn said she could not remember whether she had 
called defendant on the day of the incident, but she said if she had, it was to ask him whether he wanted to come 
visit their daughter. On cross-examination, Carolyn admitted she had called defendant on the day of the incident, 
but again said her call was only to ask if he wanted to visit their daughter and that she had not expressed any 
intent to harm herself. "(I]n reviewing counsel's performance, we give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical 
decisions and [do] not question those tactical decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." 
State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32.1J20, 984 P.2d 376. Defense counsel might have considered that successfully 
impeaching Carolyn's testimony by drawing out the inconsistency was sufficient, and that to delve further into the 
subject might only have served to highlight the contrast between Carolyn's gracious encouragement of visitation 
and defendant's subsequent harassing behavior. Thus, we cannot say defense counsel's decision not to pursue 
the contradiction in Carolyn's testimony fell outside the wide latitude accorded trial counsel in making tactical 
decisions. 
II. Constitutionality of Section 76-9-201 
1J13 Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999) is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and void 
for vagueness. 
Faced with overbreadth and vagueness attacks on a statute or ordinance, our first task is to 
determine whether the enactment makes unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail and we should then examine the 
facial vagueness challenge. If it does, it may be held facially invalid even if it also has legitimate 
application. 
Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
1J14 At the time of the incident giving rise to this case, section 76-9-201 read: 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in the jurisdiction where 
the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to annoy, alarm another, intimidate, 
offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten any person at the called number or recklessly creating a 
risk thereof, the person: 
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues; 
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues, or after 
having been told not to call back, causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or 
continuously; 
(c) makes a telephone call and insults, taunts, or challenges the recipient of the 
telephone call or any person at the called number in a manner likely to provoke a 
violent or disorderly response; 
(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or profane language or suggests any 
lewd or lascivious act; or 
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical harm, or damage to 
any person or the property of any person 
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor 
Itah Code Ann § 76-9-201 (1999) & 
15 The information charging defendant with telephone harassment did not indicate under which subsection of 
tah Code Ann § 76-9-201 (1999) he was charged The trial court's findings, however, support a guilty verdict 
nly under subsections (a) and (b) of section 76-9-201 We therefore confine our analysis of section 76-9-201 to 
jbsections (a) and (b), we do not address the constitutionality of the remaining subsections See Provo City v 
fratcott. 2000 UT App 86 119 n 2, 1 P 3d 1113 
A Subsection (a) 
16 In Provo City v Whatcott. which was decided while this case was pending on appeal, we analyzed 
jbsections (a) and (d) of section 76-9-201, concluding that each was unconstitutionally overbroad See id at ffi[9 
2, 16 Whatcott's analysis of subsection (a) forecloses the need to revisit here the question of subsection (a)'s 
>nstitutionality See State v Belqard, 615 P 2d 1274 1275-76 (Utah 1980) (holding that a defendant may claim 
e benefit of appellate decisions issued while the defendant's case is pending final judgment on appeal) Thus, 
3 restate VWiatcott s analysis of subsection (a) only as useful prelude to our similar analysis of subsection (b) 
7 An enactment which is unconstitutionally overbroad "is one 'which does not aim specifically at evils within the 
owable area of state control but on the contrary sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary 
cumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press '" Logan City v Huber, 786 P 2d 1372, 
>75(UtahCt App 1990) (quoting ThornhiH v Alabama 310 US 88, 97, 60 S Ct 736,741-42(1940)) 
dditional citation omitted) In Whatcott we said of section 76-9-201 
esumably the Legislature intended to prohibit threatening and menacing calls, and calls that would provoke a 
sach of the peace This is certainly within the Legislature's power, and does not offend the First Amendment 
But section 76-9-201 sweeps even more broadly Under subsection (a), the statute prohibits any 
"telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues," where the caller has "recklessly created] a 
risk" of "annoy[ing], a!arm[ing] , intimidating] offend[ing], abus[ing], threatening] harassing] or 
frightening] the recipient ld_ Read thus, the statute would prohibit a potentially huge universe of 
otherwise legitimate telephone calls 
00UTApp86atfflJ10-11 
8 We then gave five example categories of legitimate calls prohibited under subsection (a) (1) "unwanted 
ephone solicitations made to a private home during the dinner hour", (2) calls from a mother to "a young adult 
io has recently moved out of the family home," which the mother makes in order "to make sure he is alright," 
d which she continues to make despite "his exasperation (frequently and vocally expressed)", (3) calls from "'a 
nsumer [to] the seller or producer of a product to express dissatisfaction of product performance"', (4) calls 
m ,Ma businessman [to] another to protest failure to perform a contractual obligation'", and (5) calls from '"a 
nstituent [to] his legislator to protest the legislator's stand on an issue '" ld_ at 1ffl12, 14 (quoting State v 
pnso, 279 N W2d 710, 714 (Wis Ct App 1979)) Each of these calls would be prohibited because of the 
lers' "conscious disregard of the substantial likelihood that the call would annoy [the recipient and thus] bring 
> call within the statute's ambit" Id. at ^12 "These few examples show that the overbreadth of subsection[] (a). 
is real and substantial" Id. at 1114 Thus, if defendant's conviction were based solely on subsection (a), we 
uld be constrained to reverse 
B Subsection (b) 
3 We now turn to an analysis of subsection (b) Subsection (b) contains two parts The first prohibits the "mak 
3 of] repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues," if the caller acts with the requisite intent, 
i.e., "with intent to annoy, alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten any person at the 
called number or recklessly creates] a risk thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1)(b) (1999). The second 
prohibits the "caus[ing of] the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously" if the caller "ha[s] been told 
not to call back," and if the caller acts with the requisite intent. IdL We discuss each of subsection (b)'s prohibitions 
separately. 
1. Repeated Calling 
1120 Subsection (a) prohibits "a [single] telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues," if made with the 
requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1)(a) (1999). The first part of subsection (b) criminalizes "repeated 
telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues," if made with the requisite intent, I j l § 76-9-201 (1)(b) 
(emphasis added). Prohibiting repeated calls rather than only single calls does little to narrow the field of 
otherwise legitimate communications that subsection (a) unconstitutionally "'sweeps within its ambit.'" Huber. 786 
P.2d at 1375 (citation omitted). 
1J21 In other words, tracking the examples set out in Whatcott, the telephone solicitor who attempts to call again 
"at a more convenient time"; the overly anxious mother who calls her grown son repeatedly despite his expressed 
exasperation; the consumer who calls customer service the first, second, third, and fourth times her computer 
crashes; the businessman who leaves a voice mail message for his counterpart at another company regarding an 
unperformed contractual term, then calls again later to speak in person, and then calls a third t ime-or twenty 
times-to "keep the pressure on"; and the concerned citizen who calls on different occasions to chastize his 
legislator for her stance on varied issues might all be subject to prosecution under the first part of subsection (b), 
as well as under subsection (a). Again, it is the callers' "conscious disregard of the substantial likelihood that the 
[repeated] call[s] would annoy [the recipient that] bring[s] the call within the statute's ambit." What_cgtt, 2000 UT 
App 86 at 1J12. Because both the first and repeat calls in the above scenarios are legitimate, we hold that the first 
part of subsection (b) is also facially overbroad and unconstitutional. If defendant's conduct had fit solely under 
the first part of subsection (b), we would, again, be constrained to reverse. 
2. Repeatedly Calling After a Reguest to Discontinue 
1J22 The trial court's findings, however, clearly support defendant's conviction for telephone harassment under the 
second part of subsection (b). The second part of subsection (b) prohibits "caus[ing] the telephone of another to 
ring repeatedly or continuously" when one has "been told not to call back," and when one acts with the requisite 
intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1)(b) (1999). The trial court found that defendant made "a large number of 
telephone calls" to Carolyn; that "she asked the defendant not to make additional calls and yet he continued to do 
so"; and that defendant's "clear. . . intent [was] to annoy." 
H23 In order to conclude that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad "where conduct and not merely speech is 
involved . . . the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the 
statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma. 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918 (1973). We 
conclude that, unlike subsection (a) and the first part of subsection (b), any possible overbreadth in the second 
part of subsection (b) is not substantial. 
H24 The distinguishing feature of the second part of subsection (b) is that to be prosecuted under it, one must 
"hav[e] been told not to call back" and yet, with the requisite intent, nevertheless then "causes the telephone of 
another to ring repeatedly or continuously." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1)(b) (1999) (emphasis added). "The right 
of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must 
be opportunity to win their attention." Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S. 77, 87, 69 S. Ct. 448, 454 (1949) (emphasis 
added). Clearly, there is no right to audibly invade another's home or place of business by telephone ring in an 
attempt to commandeer her listening ear when she has affirmatively expressed a desire to be left alone. Cf. id. at 
87-88, 69 S. Ct. at 454 ("Opportunity to gain the public's ears by objectionably amplified sound on the streets is 
more assured by the right of free speech than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on the streets."). 
We see no substantial overbreadth in the second part of subsection (b)'s prohibition.^1 
1125 Defendant also argues that the intent requirement of section 76-9-201 is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if persons "'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
its application."' United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1225 (1997) (quoting Connally v. 
General Constr. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct 126, 127 (1926)). V\fe do not believe that persons of common 
intelligence must guess at whether, after having been told not to call again, causing the telephone of another to 
ring repeatedly or continuously will create a risk of annoying, alarming, intimidating, offending, abusing, 
threatening, harassing, or frightening the other person. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999). It most assuredly 
will. We thus see no unconstitutional vagueness in the intent requirement of section 76-9-201 as applied to the 
second part of subsection (b). 
IJ26 Because the undisputed findings of the trial court place defendant's conduct squarely within the prohibitions 
Df the second part of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1)(b), which we hold to be constitutional, we affirm defendant's 
conviction under that portion of the subsection. 
CONCLUSION 
I27 We follow our decision in VNfratcott that Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1)(a) (1999) is unconstitutionally 
>verbroad on its face. We also conclude that the first part of section 76-9-201 (1)(b) is also unconstitutionally 
overbroad on its face. However, we determine that the second part of subsection 76-9-201 (1)(b),^ prohibiting 
me from, "after having been told not to call back, causpng] the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or 
ontinuously," when done with culpable intent, is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Nor is the intent requirement of 
ection 76-9-201 unconstitutionally vague in the context of the second part of subsection (b). 
28 As defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails, and because his conduct fits squarely within the prohibition 
ontained in the second part of subsection (b), we affirm his conviction for telephone harassment. 
iregory K. Orme, Judge 
29 WE CONCUR: 
orman H Jackson, 
residing Judge 
amela T. Greenwood, Judge 
It is inconceivable that if defendant were truly concerned for Carolyn's safety, his response to Officer Bastian's 
dication he was on his way to defendant's apartment would not have been something like: "No! You've got to 
ay with Carolyn. She may try to kill herself." 
[Defendant] also cites the free speech guarantees of the Utah Constitution, Utah Const, art. I, § 15. 
However, he makes no argument that the state provision should be interpreted any differently than 
the federal provision . . . . Therefore, we choose to confine our analysis to his arguments based on 
the first amendment. 
ovo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 n.2 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant makes only a facial overbreadth challenge to section 76-9-201 and does not argue that it is overly 
Dad as applied to him. "In the First Amendment area, the overbreadth doctrine gives a defendant standing to 
h»hflif of others not before the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the 
deSlnt ." SSSScSS!SS?935P^ lS59 .1263 -64 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). See Bigelow v. Virqima. 
421 U.S. 809, 814-17, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2229-30 (1975). 
A c^tmn 7R 9 201 has since been amended to delete subsections (a) and (d). which ^ ™ J " ^ * Jf5® 
i -5 e ?1 • «^  SnnoUTADp86 1 P.3d 1113. See Utah Code Ann. §76-9-201 (Supp. 2001) (amendment 
City v ^ ^ c o t t 2 0 0 0 J ^ f f f i 7c)
 and (e) are no^codified. with minor stylistic changes, as subsections (a), (b). 
2 ? & resTecSy S i In" S i Spinton. unless stated otherwise, we refer to each subsection as it appeared 
in the code version in effect at the time of the incident giving rise to this case. 
6. As previously indicated. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (l)(b) (1999) is now codified as Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
(1)(a) (Supp. 2001). 
